This paper argues that the pursuit of special and differential treatments (SDT) by developing countries has hampered the liberalization of global service trade, which is one of the causes of the only slowing improving of service efficiency globally. We use value added per worker as a proxy of production efficiency, and show the growth rate of service efficiency is much lower than agriculture and industry. Despite the progress in world commodity market integration in past half century, the world service market remains highly segmented, which can be seen clearly from the World Bank's STRD index and CHB index. We argue that the SDT negotiation contributes to the service market segment, and give three reasons on why it is difficult for developing countries to be granted SDT in service. In the last part we present some suggestions on trade negotiations in the future.
Global Service Efficiency and the Search for Special and Differential Treatment

Introduction
The past three decades have witnessed a transition in the global economy from an industry to a service economy. In terms of value added at current prices and exchange rates, the service sector was already dominant in 1970, accounting for But global service efficiency does not improve much. As a report by the World Bank (2009) stated: "As incomes continue to rise, people's needs become less "material" and they begin to demand more services-in health, education, entertainment, and many other areas. Meanwhile, labor productivity in services does not grow as fast as it does in agriculture and industry because most service jobs cannot be filled by machines. The lower mechanization of the service sector also explains why employment in the service sector continues to grow while employment in agriculture and industry declines because of technological progress that increases labor productivity and eliminates jobs."
In this paper we argue that, in addition to the reasons mentioned by the World Bank, the segmentation of global service market contributes to the slow improving of service efficiency. Services may be more labor-intensive than agriculture and industry, but this does not mean that there are no economies of scale in services, and an integrated service market will increase the service efficiency, especially in core business services such as banking, insurance, transportation and telecommunications.
Why is the service market segmented? Traditionally, service products are classified as non-tradable goods and the market will be confined to local suppliers, for example in the case of hair-cutting, and also in retailing and government services. But this cannot explain most of modern services, such as the Call-Center industries in India. According to trade theory the difference between tradable and non-tradable lies in the trade cost, which mainly depends on technology. As science and technology advanced in the past decades, many services are now not only tradable, but also can be traded more quickly than goods, such as online banking services. There must be some institutional elements which impede the integration of world services.
In this paper we argue that the pursuing of special and differential treatment (SDT) by developing countries has hampered the liberalization of global service trade. As the rounds of negotiations in the GATT made tariffs on goods very low, from the GATS and Doha Round in the WTO countries are busy on negotiations for service liberalization. The developing economies are eager to be granted SDT from developed countries, but this is far more complex than the SDT in goods trade in 1960s. The Doha Round has been an impasse and some members are resorting to regional agreements such as the TPP. There are substantial benefits in terms of per capita income for developing nations if they are included in the world service market.
Evaluation on Global Service Efficiency in Past Decades
In economics, production efficiency implies that an economy is producing as much as possible without wasting precious resources. Theoretically, production efficiency will include all of the points along the production possibility frontier, but this is difficult to measure in practice. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a nonparametric method often used in productive efficiency, and there are also parametric approaches which can be used for the estimation of production frontiers. These frontier analysis methods may be more suitable for estimating efficiency in industry sectors, since there are more difficulties to applying them to service sector. Service products are not material and sometimes even difficult to specify, for example whether loans are output of banks or the input of them.
Although fixed assets can be critical inputs in several service sectors, such as transportation and telecommunications, most service sectors rely heavily on human capital rather than material capital, for example business services and professional services. The data availability on other inputs is another problem, because at the aggregate level of country or world service data, it can hardly give a clear definition on capital input in service. Therefore, many literatures on service efficiency use labour as the sole input in analyzing service efficiency. As Bjurek,
Hjalmarsson and Forsund (1990) pointed out, in service sector capital in the form of office space and computer terminals is almost proportional to labour input. We will follow this tradition, and use the ratio of service value-added to employment in services as a proxy for service efficiency 1 . 1 In theory it would be difficult to compute value-added in a service sector, for example the value-added of a bank. We omit this problem and take the service value-added data from the WDI database. Figure 1 depicts the trend of efficiency (proxy by value-added per worker) in service and agriculture of the world. We can see that efficiency in world services is about ten time higher than agriculture efficiency, and also more fluctuated than it. Although absent detailed sector data, we can expect the efficiencies of different service sectors should be very diverse, higher in modern services and lower in traditional services. As to the growth rate of efficiency, service efficiency growth in an average annual rate of merely 0.44%, while that of agriculture growth more quickly, with average annual rate of 1.85%.
It is impossible to study the world service efficiency over a long time horizon, since there are no service employment data for the world before 2000. We then turn to country data to see how service efficiency changes relative to agriculture and industry efficiencies. We use China and South Korea, two most successful developing economies in the past decades. The data period is 1980-2010. Figure 2 is the annual growth rate in China's three sectors, agriculture, industry and services in three decades since its reform and opening up. We can see in the early 1980s, agriculture efficiency growth was higher than service, and service growth higher than industry. This may be due to the fact that industry is more capital intensive, and thus need more time to update its fixed capital to acquire higher efficiency. In contrasts agriculture and service are more labour intensive in The lower growth rate in service efficiency is more significant in the case of South
Korea, as Figure 3 shows. During the three decades the increase rate of service efficiency nearly never higher than industry efficiency. Korea's agriculture efficiency, although more fluctuated than service, is also higher than it in most years. we discuss several elements before we present our own explanation.
Some blame that as an accounting category, "the service sector" may be an impediment to understanding, and the service economy is at least two economies, one characterized by high rates and the second by low rates of (measured) productivity growth. High-productivity-growth service industries including Despite the progress in world commodity market integration in past half century, the world service market remains highly segmented. We will first make an evaluation of world service segment, and then discuss how such market segment contributes to the low efficiency growth rate in service sector.
b) How the world service market is segmented?
We first use aggregate data to show there is a kind of "home bias" in service sector.
If world service market were as integrated as world commodity market, we should expect the share of service trade in total trade equals the share of service value-added in GDP, and thus the ratio of them should be near one. The smaller this ratio is, the less service trade relative to service value-added, and thus the more home bias. Table 2 reports the service trade relative share thus computed of seven main economies, two country groups and the world as a total. Notes: Computed as the ratio of service trade to total trade of a given economy, as a percent of the ratio of the ratio of service value-added to GDP.
LDC is the least developed countries as UN classification; OECD represent all OECD members.
Source: Authors' Computation based on the data from World Bank's WDI database.
In Table 2 we can see the world average ratio is about 30%, which means the share of service trade in total trade is only one third of service's share in GDP. As to the seven main economies selected, the ratio of US is very close to the world average as well as the ratio of OECD countries. The ratio of India, UK and France are higher than world average, and the ratio of Japan, Germany and China are lower than it. This supports the argument that manufacturing countries (China, Germany and Japan) are relative lower in service trade ratio, while service countries (UK, India) have higher service trade ratio. The abnormally high ratio of LDC countries in service is due to their low share of service sector in GDP, rather than a higher share of service trade. Although the ratio less than one is understandable considering some service industries are really "untradeable", e.g. construction, it is still strange that there is not even a slight trend of increasing of this ratio in the decade. In fact, the world ratio is slightly lower in 2013 as compare to that of 2005. Table 3 we can see the world service trade market is far from integrated.
A more technical method to access the market segment in service trade is used in Barattieri (2014) . Based on Anderson and Yotov (2010), Barattieri (2014) computed a Constructed Home Bias Index (CHB) to quantify the extent of service market segment. The CHB index is the ratio of the realized internal trade in a given sector relative to the internal trade that would prevail in a frictionless world.
Since this index is a pure number, it can be compared across different sectors, and by appropriately weighted average in all service sectors it can capture the liberalization of world service market across times.
The CHB index of country in sector k is defined as: We do not discuss more on the computation details, and list selected economies' CHB index in manufacturing and service sectors as Table 4 . We can see that the US is the most open country with the lowest CHB index in both sectors, and also the only one whose service sector is more open than manufacturing sector. The world average CHB index in service sector fluctuated between 30 and 32 during this period, about one half higher than that of manufacturing sector, and had no trend to decrease. Therefore, the service sector shows more home bias than manufacturing sector, and thus world service market is more segment than manufacturing market.
c) How a segmented service market contributes to low efficiency growth?
We then discuss how the service market segment contribute to low growth rate of service efficiency, or in other words how service market integration leads to higher efficiency improvement. The rationales are similar to that of commodity markets and we just list several here. There are many other reasons that can explain why service market integration contributes to higher efficiency growth, e.g. knowledge diffusion through learning-by-doing mechanism, competition effects among service providers, etc.
We do not discuss further on this, and now turn to the next part: why world service market is more segmented than commodity market?
Service Market Segment and SDT Negotiations
Among the four modes of service trade defined by the WTO, only Mode 1 (services that are traded internationally across borders) shares some similarity with commodity trade, and the other three modes are distinct from traditional concept of "trade" in that they require the movement of consumer or supplier, instead of the "service" itself. Therefore, the Mode 2 (services that require the consumer to be in the location of the producer), Mode 3 (services that require commercial presence in the form of foreign direct investment), and Mode 4 (services that require the temporary cross-border movement of worker) of service trade are highly related on the cross-border movement of human or capital, and thus under stricter supervision by governments. This is the fundamental reason that world service market is more segmented than commodity market.
There have been negotiations on service trade liberalization since the period of the GATT, and these negotiations continued in the frame of WTO. But the progress in service trade cannot be compared to that in commodity trade. We briefly document the history of service trade negotiation before explaining the effect of special and differential treatment (SDT) on this.
a) Service Trade Negotiations
From the creation of the GATT in 1947, trade negotiations had focused on tariffs issues in commodity trade. But as service sector accounts for 70 percent or more of economic activity in high-income countries, services become essential inputs into the production of all industries, as well as new technologies emerge that allowed competition emerge in markets that were traditionally regarded as natural monopolies, it turns out to be a necessary for advanced economies to begin undertake regulatory reforms to increase the contestability of service markets.
It was the United States, who perceived it had a comparative advantage in services, launched the initiative to consider rules for trade in services in the early 1980s.
The US made an initial attempt to put services on the GATT negotiating agenda during the 1982 GATT ministerial meeting, but only met with vigorous resistance from many contracting parties and even an agreement on negotiating in this field could not be reached. However, the meeting did result in establishing a GATT work program on services to undertake studies on service sectors.
The US and other developed economies continued their efforts during the 1986 ministerial meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay to put service on the GATT agenda.
This was defended most vigorously by the so called G10, a group of ten developing countries including Argentina, Brazil, India, Nigeria and others, which rejected launching talks on services. At last both made some concession: the services negotiations would proceed as a part of the Uruguay Round, but on a parallel track from talks on goods.
Since there does not exist a common set of border barriers such as tariffs in service trade, it is quite difficult for the negotiators to agree on what field of service barriers they should negotiate about. It seems a GATT-type approach of exchanging equivalent "amounts" of trade liberalization simply impossible to emulate in service negotiations. As a result, subjective notions of sectoral reciprocity became the focal point of negotiations. We analyze this in the next part.
The Opportunities in global SDT Negotiations
The pursues of SDT by developing countries is one of the reasons which make the WTO negotiations in the Doha Round to go nowhere. Why it is so difficult for the developing countries to be granted SDT in service? Here we give three reasons. China and India are among the top 10 service exporters in the world. In 2013
China was the fifth, only behind the US, UK, Germany and France, and India was the sixth largest exporter. Granting SDT to so large developing countries would bring large impact on developed countries.
Detailed world service trade data is not available, so we take the US service imports as an example. In 2014 the US service import is 477.4 billion US$, of which import from advanced economies (Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) is 272.3 billion, the others from developing economies 2 . If all the developing economies were granted SDT in US service imports, it would be a problem to the developed exporters. c) Are the free riders belonging to the same coalition?
The group of "developing countries" are so diversified that it is difficult for them
to agree on what SDT they should pursue from the developed countries. As Whalley (1990) pointed out, over the years the differences between developing countries have grown to the point that in the Uruguay Round a grand coalition of all developing countries did not exist in any active sense. The current divergence of so called developing countries in service trade is no less obvious as it was three decades ago in goods trade.
Since there are more than a hundred developing countries in the world, it is difficult to make a complete analysis on their difference in services. We list several main indicators of five largest developing countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Russia), and the group of LDCs in Table 6 . There are obvious differences between these indicators. The service sector has different importance to different countries. Service value-added accounts for nearly two thirds in GDP Confined the coalition to the 48 LDCs may not help much, because although those
LDCs share a similarity of low GDP per capita, they are quite different in many other characters e.g. comparative advantages, resources, etc.
Does SDT really help?
We have thus far shown that the pursuing of SDT in service trade by developing countries contributes to the delay of Doha Round negotiations and the segmentation of world service markets, which then leads to the slow efficiency growth of service sector. Is it rational for the developing economies to ask for SDT despite the price of market segmentation? Since there is currently no SDT in service, we will use the SDT in goods trade as a reference and show it actually had no remarkable benefit to the developing countries granted it.
The rationale of SDT in trade is based on a fundamental fallacy that opening one's market to others involved "concessions" that needed to be "paid" for. The OECD countries can open markets to each other because each wish to gain better access to the markets of the others. By SDT developing countries were excused from the need to pay for new export opportunities to developed economies. For example, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme in 1968 allowed all developed countries voluntarily grant tariff preferences to developing countries.
But as successive rounds brought down tariffs among developed economies, the margin of preference to developing countries was diminishing. Such preference was also becoming less secure since it was tied to the level of economic development with a "graduation" clause. A number of products most important to developing countries were excluded from GSP, such as agriculture and textiles products. Therefore, the gain from SDT was not large. SDT policy could also be circumvented in a globalized economy without helping those countries it aimed to. This can be seen clearly in the experience of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) countries. Began in 2001, the AGOA enabled some less developed African countries to export hundreds of apparel products quota-free and duty-free to the United States, which was a kind of SDT to specific developing countries. As pointed out by Rotunno (2013) , a key feature of the AGOA preference was the absence of rules of origin (ROOs), which are usually imposed under regional trade agreements to avoid transshipment.
Therefore, the easiest way for these underdeveloped countries to export to the US is to import directly from other countries and transship them. Take Botswana, Namibia and Uganda as an example, as in Figure 4 . Their export to the US jumped significantly when they entered the AGOA, but fall sharply following the expiration of the MFA quota system in 2005. Since a country's industry structure and export ability cannot fluctuate so dramatically, a reasonable explanation for this pattern change is that these countries largely transshipped other countries' exports to the US, and their own production and export ability was not strengthened by the SDT. Round into an impasse and continued put world service market segmented as ever.
If an integrated service market is the goal, what can we do in the future of world service negotiation? "There are several policies that might be considered going forward. They include making SDT and exception, grouping developing nations, and developing a tiered negotiation system. We leave these to the future studies.
